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Anti-hesitation 
Modes of Uncertainty: Anthropological Cases, edited by Limor Samimian-Darash & Paul Rabinow 
The University of Chicago Press: Chicago and London 
 
In recent years, Sri Lanka’s scientific and medical community has become increasingly involved in the 
study of an epidemic of chronic kidney failure among paddy farmers.1 A hospital nephrologist first 
discovered the disease in the early 1990s, after which the number of identified cases as well as 
deaths from kidney failure began to spiral. While estimates of disease burden and fatality vary, as 
many as 35,000 people in Sri Lanka’s North-Central Province may have succumbed, and up to 
200,000 may be suffering from progressive kidney damage. The epidemic has garnered attention not 
just because of its sheer scale, but because researchers have yet to identify the cause of the disease 
– leading the WHO to label it Chronic Kidney Disease of Unknown Aetiology (CKDu). Over the 
decades since, at least 35 separate causal hypotheses have been proposed, only around half of 
which have been (inconclusively) tested. ‘Just when you think you’ve found a theory that fits all the 
facts, up pops something that ruins the whole argument!’ an NGO volunteer working on the problem 
recently told me. But reading even this as being progress of a kind, the island’s leading nephrologist 
and member of Sri Lanka’s CKDu Presidential Taskforce, proclaimed in a public meeting in May 2016: 
‘it is no longer accurate to say CKD of unknown origin, we should now say CKD of uncertain origin.’ I 
suspect that most in the room, and the speaker himself, took the subtle change in name to mean 
that all of the available theories amounted to something, in the sense that at least one of them, or a 
combination of them, had to be right.  
Limor Samimian-Darash and Paul Rabinow, editors of a book called Modes of Uncertainty: 
Anthropological Cases (2015), might disagree with this view. For them, the shift from ‘unknown’ to 
‘uncertain’ would not be taken to mean a small reduction of risk for people living in affected areas 
achieved by an incremental advance in knowledge concerning the disease. Instead, Samimian-
Darash and Rabinow would view the shift to uncertainty as the opening up of a new conceptual 
space through which members of the Presidential CKDu Taskforce might now study and manage the 
disease. Samimian-Darash and Rabinow argue that we live in an age when the dangers we face are 
increasingly unfit for traditional risk analysis, simply because many such dangers exist beyond the 
scope of quantifiable measurement. CKDu is a very good case in point. Despite its epidemic nature 
and the plethora of studies testing different theories, ‘no one has found the culprit’ as CKDu 
researchers like to say. Mostly trained in the health sciences, members of the CKDu research 
community often invoke the example of Dr John Snow – a nineteenth century British physician who 
is something of a hero in public health circles. Dr Snow, they point out, had been able to identify the 
cause and source of a cholera outbreak in Victorian London through the spatial analysis of public 
health records, which led him to a water pump in Soho. Switching off the pump ended the epidemic 
and proved, once and for all, that cholera was caused by a water-born contaminate. By championing 
what became the leading method of public health investigation ever since, Dr Snow demonstrated 
that by narrowing down the range of possible causes one would eventually arrive at the culprit – a 
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method advocated too, of course, by Snow’s contemporary, Sherlock Holmes: ‘When you have 
eliminated the impossible, whatever remains, however improbable, must be the truth.’ 
Yet for Samimian-Darash and Rabinow, uncertainty is not simply a transitional zone between 
ignorance and knowledge – a blight on the Enlightenment promise of progress or one of Holmes’s 
stumbling blocks on the path to solving a case. For them, uncertainty is a new way of knowing, and 
one that brings in turn new ways of acting. ‘We make the case,’ they write, ‘that scholars should not 
only focus solely on the appearance of new risks and dangers in the world, which no doubt abound, 
but should also treat uncertainty itself as a problem and examine the forms of governing and 
experience that are emerging in relation to it’ (p.1). The central claim that Samimian-Darash and 
Rabinow make is this: if what anthropologists and sociologists have called ‘risk’ was defined as a 
negative state, in the sense that risk was a problem to be curtailed or controlled somehow, 
uncertainty should be understood as a positive state, because it allows us to react to the future 
before it is known or meaningfully predicted. For example, they summarise Mary Douglas’s path-
breaking work on the subject (e.g. Douglas & Wildavsky 1982; Douglas 1966; Douglas 1992) as 
concerned with how cultures select only certain kinds of danger and risk and then try to establish 
certainty in the face of future ambiguities by attaching taboo or blame (p.2). They also summarise 
the work by Ulrich Beck and Anthony Giddens on risk (e.g. Beck 1992; Giddens 1990) as a project 
concerned with how ‘real’ risks in the world come about and are managed as various attempts to 
reduce dangers in the future (p.2).  
Samimian-Darash and Rabinow mark out their own contribution as being distinct from those earlier 
approaches by how they understand ‘risk and uncertainty as concepts rather than as things in the 
world, through which certain knowledge and practices circulate and are made available’ (p.3). 
Uncertainty is not, then, the hesitation we might feel when asked to decide in the face of conflicting 
accounts or incomplete information, but a kind of anti-hesitation that makes decisions about the 
future possible. If risk is to be avoided, uncertainty is to be embraced. Samimian-Darash elaborated 
more clearly on what is meant by this in an earlier work, not reproduced in Modes of Uncertainty, 
where she explores Israel’s response to the threat of pandemic flu (Samimian-Darash 2013). 
Samimian-Darash calls the forms of preparedness designed by the Israeli state ‘technologies of 
uncertainty.’ That is, strategies of preparing for emergency before much or anything at all of the 
emergency is yet known, and through which risk is not reduced or assumed to be incalculable, but 
instead through which uncertainty is retained as a key hallmark of the possible response (ibid.). 
Using a method adopted by Rabinow in most of his previous work, Modes of Uncertainty thus calls 
for the problematization of uncertainty. Foucault (1994, 670; quoted in Collier et al., 2004: 3) argued 
that problematization is an interesting analytical method because it reveals ‘the ensemble of 
discursive and non-discursive practices that make something enter into the play of true and false 
and constitute it as an object of thought.’ Thus, Samimian-Darash and Rabinow are less interested in 
questions of what is uncertain and whether things are less certain now than they were before, than 
they are in how uncertainty came to be deployed as a concept that seems to have explanatory 
power today but perhaps did not before. As Samimian-Darash and Rabinow put it, ‘We ask how 
observations about uncertainty come to circulate in the contemporary world, constituting a new 
problematic field for which certain policies emerge as solutions’ (p.3). To that end, Modes of 
Uncertainty is divided into three sections – ‘Economics and Entrepreneurialism,’ ‘Security and 
Humanitarianism,’ and ‘Environment and Health’ – each containing three to four contributed 
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chapters that deal with specific examples of contemporary uncertainty governance. These are book-
ended by a brief introduction and even briefer afterword by the editors, in which they develop their 
theory of uncertainty. 
Part 1, which deals with the world of economics and entrepreneurialism, offers case studies of how 
uncertainty in global financial markets is utilised. Given that risk management has always been most 
elaborated in this field, but given also not just the rise of speculative trading but the recent spate of 
localised market crashes caused by ‘rogue’ trading, it is here that the argument concerning 
uncertainty’s desirability – and dangers – is most clearly developed. The chapters in this section do 
have much in common with other recent anthropology in this field, most notably Arjun Appadurai’s 
(2013) writings on financial futures, especially in how all share a concern to describe how 
uncertainty itself is a means of profit and financialisation processes are extending logics of 
uncertainty far beyond their traditional zones of operation. But if Appadurai remains content with a 
theory of uncertainty derived largely from Beck’s (1992) notion of the risk society, the three chapters 
offered here chart a path closer to that envisaged by Samimian-Darash and Rabinow. That said, the 
three chapters, by focusing on urban centres and urban elites, lack Appadurai’s concern to describe 
new subjectivities of uncertainty at the bottom of the pyramid – a criticism that can also be applied 
to much of the rest of the book and to which I return more fully below.  
In Chapter 1, ‘Uncertainty Makes Us Free: Insurance and Liberal Rationality,’ Pat O’Malley draws 
from Peter L. Bernstein’s contention that risk is a ‘prison’ that traps action in a never-ending spiral of 
doubt, and John Maynard Keynes’ celebration of ‘uncertain knowledge’ as a space, created by not 
knowing, that releases action, imagination, and invention. O’Malley argues that insurance policy in 
Britain has always struggled to manage risk and uncertainty that seemingly move in opposite 
directions, yet through their relationship have created what the author calls British liberalism – the 
freedom to contract, unconstrained by risk. This theme is returned to in Chapter 3: ‘The Gaming of 
Chance: Online Poker Software and the Potentialization of Uncertainty,’ by Natasha Dow Schüll. To 
my mind the standout contribution to the volume, Schüll’s paper draws us into the glamorous, 
dystopian, fast-paced, high-stakes world of professional and semi-professional online poker players 
who thanks to their technical dexterity can operate across dozens of tables at once. To do so they 
run software designed to give them real-time information (as well as end of game debriefs) on how 
they are playing, how other players are playing, and to give nods on when to step up the game or 
when to bow out. Yet the software is not designed or able to reduce risk of loss or chance of winning 
per se, but instead to enhance uncertainty, in the sense of enhancing anti-hesitation. Gamers seek to 
meld with their software and tables, and attune to the perpetual uncertainty of online poker to 
achieve an almost transcendental state (my phrasing) defined by uncertainty. Thus the software is 
considered legitimate and fair to use, and becomes in a very important sense part of gamers’ habitus 
as they rapidly navigate across multiple simultaneous games that no ordinary uncertain player could 
cope with. 
Part 2, which deals with security and humanitarianism, shifts the focus to the kinds of post-9/11 
techniques and technologies that Collier, Lakoff, and Rabinow (Collier et al. 2004; Collier & Lakoff 
2008) have previously called ‘distributed preparedness.’ In a world where the threat of attack or 
emergency is no longer thought of in terms of ‘if’ but ‘when,’ the four chapters in this section 
document new forms of policing and imprisonment (chapters 4 and 5), mental health treatment 
(chapter 6), and avian flu planning (chapter 7) that accept uncertainty and try to work with it. I am 
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less convinced that the concepts of risk and uncertainty used in these chapters are so different from 
those that characterised Douglas’s and Beck’s understandings. Chapter 4, ‘Policing Uncertainty: On 
Suspicious Activity Reporting’ by Meg Stalcup, and Chapter 5, ‘Guantánamo’s Catch-22: The 
Uncertain Interrogation Subject’ by Rebecca Lemov, especially seem to me to deal with old-
fashioned risk assessment problems in law and order. Samimian-Darash and Rabinow’s thesis works 
best in chapter 7, ‘The Malicious and the Uncertain: Biosecurity, Self-Justification, and the Arts of 
Living’ by Gaymon Bennett. Bennett explores medical research tasked with the job identifying 
possible future pandemics through the study of current biological strains that could, through change 
and circumstance, herald new outbreaks. Here, we find uncertainty not as a kind of anti-hesitation 
to be embraced for high-risk/high-gain games of profit and loss, but as a principle but incalculable 
variable to be worked with in its own right. 
Part 3, which deals with environment and health, explores the uncertainties that abound in our 
understanding of global and environmental public health issues. With humankind ‘officially’ now 
recognised as a geological force, extreme weather events on the rise, and climate tipping points 
almost reached, the relative certainty afforded by the Holocene, upon which our societies and 
economies are built, is giving way to a future of considerable unknowns. This is the subject 
addressed in chapter 8, ‘What Is a Horizon? Navigating Thresholds in Climate Change Uncertainty,’ 
by Adriana Petryna. The thrust of Petryna’s chapter is the observation that future, lethal climate 
events are likely to be characterised by what she calls ‘blindsidedness’; that is, events emerging from 
the unseen and unknown and which leave little or no time for disaster response. Akin, then, to the 
kind of future planning for uncertainty that pandemics call for, planning for the uncertainty of 
climate change requires a reorientation of vision. Petryna calls this vision a ‘horizon,’ which, 
depending on quite where it is placed, accommodates some kinds of futures but excludes others. 
She argues that because the drawing of a horizon is necessarily an act which borrows time, in the 
sense that the act may be able to respond to some, but never all, risks, horizons ‘become tools of 
optimization…within apparently incoherent earth systems’ (p.150). 
Individually, the editors’ introduction/afterword and contributors’ separate chapters are compelling, 
and sometimes riveting. The writing is bold and, for a collection of this kind, refreshingly clear. The 
range of disciplinary approaches included – not just anthropology, despite the volume’s subtitle – 
introduced an unexpected but welcome interdisciplinarity to the book. But I was left wanting more. 
Partly I think this was due to the brevity of the editors’ own contribution, which claimed much but 
offered little; I could not help thinking their chapters had been put together in something of a rush. 
When trying to make sense of the editors’ suggestive arguments by transporting them into the 
studies provided, it turned out that few went so far in their own development of a theory of 
uncertainty as the editors’ had tried to do, and of those that did, the most convincing were the 
papers found in Part 1. Thus, the argument worked best in those places at the forefront of 
contemporary developments in economy and society, especially the chapters on market gaming, 
pandemic preparedness, and environmental change. The argument was weaker in those chapters 
that dealt with crime and poverty. Taken together with the volume’s predominance of contributions 
focused on urban, elite populations, the old criticism levelled against much writing in the 
Foucauldian tradition seems as equally to apply here: just how relevant is all of this to the rest of the 
world? 
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If the main claim of Modes of Uncertainty is that if risk is negative, uncertainty is positive, this 
upending of accepted wisdom on danger and risk had been pre-empted long before. Mary Douglas 
made exactly this kind of argument about the nature of dirt and its role in the creation of the future. 
She wrote: ‘Eliminating…[dirt]…is not a negative movement, but a positive effort to organise the 
environment…There is nothing fearful or unreasoning in our dirt avoidance: it is a creative 
movement, an attempt to relate form to function, to make unity of experience’ (Douglas 1966, p.3). 
Although it could be countered that this might be all very well but Douglas lacked a theory of 
governance to make sense of that claim beyond her grid/group theory of culture, to do so would be 
disingenuous. However Douglas herself used her insight, she was cognizant of the wider scope of 
danger and risk beyond threat and control. If Samimian-Darash and Rabinow are to demonstrate the 
validity of their argument beyond those contexts where I have shown it works best – i.e. that 
uncertainty really is something that anthropologists in general should be problematizing – then they 
need to offer us something that Douglas had offered us when she argued that dirt was only matter 
out of place. That is, a theory so compelling in its simplicity and implications that it enters the 
cannons of anthropological certainty because it truly helps us to understand ethnography from 
anywhere.  
In the final part of this review, I return to my opening vignette to explore what uncertainty could 
mean beyond Samimian-Darash and Rabinow’s urban elite. To do so, I seek a way of making greater 
use of Samimian-Darash and Rabinow’s argument through a dialogue with Mary Douglas, and return 
to my opening discussion of CKDu in Sri Lanka. To recall, Douglas’s Purity and Danger was only partly 
about avoidance and the elimination of ambiguity – that is, uncertainty as a negative. It was also a 
study of how ambiguity is essential to the generation of shared meaning – that is, uncertainty as a 
positive. Just as uncertainty for Samimian-Darash and Rabinow encourages a kind of anti-hesitation, 
danger/risk for Douglas encouraged a kind of anti-avoidance. Dirt was fundamentally not something 
to be avoided in its entirety, as it was precisely engagement with dirt that allowed the chancers and 
gamers of ‘primitive society’ to derive ritual power. With reference to the workings of contemporary 
power, Esposito (2011) makes exactly this kind of argument in his heavily biopolitical analysis of the 
‘immunity’ trope as a fundamental form of modern governance, wherein exposure to contamination 
at the centre of the social immunises the rest. But that Douglas could make this argument decades 
earlier is I think indicative of an approach to uncertainty that is much more low-tech and, dare I say, 
ethnographically familiar than the view offered by Samimian-Darash and Rabinow. 
Barrett’s (2008) study of Aghori renunciates in the holy Indian city of Banaras demonstrates what I 
mean with wonderful clarity. The low caste, Hindu Aghor sect has created a niche for itself as social 
and health welfare workers catering for patients and clients with diseases that produce revolt and 
avoidance in others. The Aghori are thus famed for their explicit consumption of ritually and 
biologically polluting substances – human flesh, faeces, ashes – in comparison to which the touch of 
a leper would be tame. Thus, the Aghori are both feared and respected by ordinary Hindus from 
whom deference and respect grows even though the Aghori are themselves hugely defiled. Barrett 
argues that the Aghori deal with this pollution in two ways, each of which resembles how the holy 
Ganga and the city itself deal with defilement. The first takes the form of a ‘transportive’ schema, 
through which the dynamic properties of water and ritual cleansing carry pollution away. This can be 
understood as a model of purification that seeks to externalise risk, where risk is seen as a problem. 
The second takes the form of a ‘transformative’ schema, though which internalisation of pollution 
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operates as a purifying act. This can be understood as a model of purification that embraces risk, 
where risk is seen as a potential (ibid.: p.41-48).  
I take the Aghori case as an example of people trying to make sense of danger, risk, and uncertainty 
in a way that encompasses both Douglas’ and Samimian-Darash and Rabinow’s understandings of 
those terms. In the Aghori’s orientation, we find something of the traditional shaman and the 
contemporary online poker player. Aghori explicitly play with the ambiguities of pollution not simply 
to rid others of pollution but so they themselves can achieve a transcendental state that is defined 
by ritual and welfare uncertainty. They rid themselves of risk (the transportive schema) just when 
they embrace risk (the transformative schema). It would be pushing Barrett’s ethnography too far to 
suggest that the Aghori, through their embracing of uncertainty, are ‘gaming karma’ in the same way 
that Schüll’s informants are ‘gaming chance’ through their own embracing of uncertainty. But I do 
propose that both communities are perfectly content to establish their niche specialisms in the 
world of uncertainty, and have strategies available to make life there not only tolerable but also 
desirable. Online poker players do so by using technologies of uncertainty like software that reads 
game movements across multiple tables; Aghori healers do so by using technologies of uncertainty 
like Ganges water and sacrificial fire.  
The same pivot on a rejection and embracing of uncertainty characterises the Sri Lankan medical 
community’s response to CKDu. Our nephrologist introduced above expressed such a move when he 
called for the ‘u’ to shift from ‘unknown’ to ‘uncertain.’ After this proclamation, he went on:  
If we don’t know then we can’t do anything. But if we are only uncertain, we have the 
obligation to do something. We have all of these theories. At least one of them, or some of 
them combined, must be right. We can, say, take this idea of water pollution [by far the 
most popular theory for CKDu in Sri Lanka] and then provide clean water. By doing that we 
might see a decrease in the number of cases. We can also try to get these farmers to drink 
more water in the fields [another theory is that CKDu is caused by growing heat stress 
among agricultural workers exposed to the effects of global warming]. 
The professor’s call to action was premised on the notion that uncertainty is not a barrier to act – as 
unknowing had been – but an opportunity to act. A raft of interventions – speculated to be remedial 
but far from proven – were subsequently offered up as things the Taskforce could be doing. These 
included the provision of clean drinking water to those residing in affected areas, information 
campaigns to warn against chronic dehydration, alcohol and drug use, and the consumption of 
sugary tea in the sun, and so on, and on. If Dr Snow found the solution to the cholera outbreak via 
the scientific method of the elimination of uncertainty, CKDu has proved resistant to definition 
precisely because it accumulates uncertainty. Yet through the accumulation, too, of some high- and 
low-tech technologies of uncertainty, uncertainty itself became a place to reside. Nowhere had this 
become clearer than in the diagnosis of CKDu, which is not really a diagnosis at all but a kind of anti-
diagnosis. To have CKDu means to have certain kinds of renal failure for which the doctor cannot 
identify any of the traditional causes (diabetes, hypertension, overmedication, snake bite…). If the 
doctor is uncertain as to the presence of any of these, she will diagnose a patient with CKDu. In 
clinical terms, this is simply to say the doctor can make no determination of cause. But in Sri Lanka in 
2016, CKDu had become a disease in its own right, the clinical feature of which was uncertainty. A 
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diagnosis of uncertainty offered patients the chance to access social and economic support 
mechanisms that other chronic but identified diseases did not. 
In this brief engagement with some of the ethnography of health and disease in Sri Lanka and India 
respectively, I have tried to show two things. The first is the complementarity that exists between 
Samimian-Darash and Rabinow’s theory and Douglas’ theory, not the displacement of the latter by 
the former. The second has been the value of exploring uncertainty far from the urban elite contexts 
that are predominate in Modes of Uncertainty. The result has also been two-fold. The first has been 
to argue that Modes of Uncertainty offers another reason not to consign Purity and Danger to 
history, a book which given the pollution crises we currently face as a planet retains an ability to 
illuminate anthropological understanding. The second, then, is the ground gained by also treating 
uncertainty as a concept rather than historical fact. The potential of Modes of Uncertainty does 
require some hard work on the part of the reader who is not prepared to simply assume Samimian-
Darash and Rabinow must be right when they claim they are on to something by problematizing 
uncertainty. But it is worthwhile to make the effort. 
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